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ABSTRACT: The dramatic increase in interorganizational partnering in the last two dec-
ades raises questions for scholars and managers regarding the value impact of inter-firm 
collaborations. Using event study methodology, this paper tests whether stock market 
reactions differ when a collaboration formation or termination is announced. In addi-
tion, the study provides an in-depth analysis of potential determinants of stock market 
reactions to collaboration formation announcements. The sample consists of 1037 an-
nouncements in German stock markets from 1997 to 2002. The results show that an 
unexpected termination announcement decreases firm valuation, and a formation an-
nouncement increases firm valuation. Further, certain collaborations are more favorable 
than others, depending on firm industry, age, size, collaboration constellations, and eq-
uity versus non-equity investment in partner firm. The results open avenues for further 
research on partnering strategies.  
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1 Introduction and motivation 
Inter-firm collaboration activity increased dramatically within the last two dec-
ades (Hergert & Morris, 1988; Hagedoorn, 1990; Badaracco, 1991; Gulati, 1995; Harbi-
son & Pekar, 1998; Audretsch, 2001). According to Deering et al. (2003), firm collabo-
rations account for 25% of turnover in 2002 of the largest US companies. By 2004, an 
increase of up to 40% is expected. Whereas for decades, management literature mainly 
concentrated on hierarchical and market organization, the cooperative interorganization 
as an intermediate hybrid form (Williamson, 1985) is attracting more and more interest. 
Drucker (1995) considers this the greatest change in the way corporate structure and 
business is conducted. Teece (1992, 24) evaluates collaborative organizational forms as 
a “new and dramatic organizational innovation”. 
The popularity of partnering suggests that entering inter-firm collaborations en-
hances the competitive position of the respective partners and thus increases their firms’ 
values. Theories like resource-based view, transaction cost theory and signaling theory 
provide arguments for the attractiveness of collaborations. However, despite the last 20 
years of research on collaborations, little is known about the value firms receive from 
such collaborations.  
This paper focuses on stock market reactions to inter-firm collaboration an-
nouncements. It is assumed that the price change of a stock to published information on 
a firm’s collaboration is directly attributable to the change in firm value as perceived by 
market participants. Using event study methodology,1 I analyze collaboration an-
nouncements from firms listed at German stock markets, which were published in the 
years 1997 to 2002. The study provides an in-depth analysis of potential determinants of 
stock market reactions to collaboration formation announcements. While most other 
studies have used samples with a few hundred observations, this paper uses a far more 
comprehensive database of 1037 announcements. The German stock market is particu-
larly well suited for this kind of study because issuers must immediately publish stock 
                                            
1
 Some scholars have expressed concerns about the validity of stock market reactions as a measure of the 
success of a strategic event (e.g. Porter 1987; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). However, Koh & Venkatra-
man (1991) tested for convergent validity between a stock market reaction following a joint venture an-
nouncement and managerial assessment. Their results suggest that stock market signals and managerial 
assessments are convergent measures of success.  
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price relevant information and 99% of this information is published over electronic sys-
tems. Finally, the paper differs from previous work in analyzing both a period of a more 
bullish market from 1997 until March 2000 and a period of a more bearish market from 
April 2000 to the end of 2002.  
The paper examines stock market reactions to inter-firm collaboration an-
nouncements pursuant to section 15 of the German Securities and Trading Act (WpHG). 
For the purpose of this study, inter-firm collaborations are defined as a voluntary, for-
mal, cooperative agreement between two or more organizations involving either a pool-
ing or trading of resources, linked with or without shared equity.2  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the overall value-creating 
mechanisms of inter-firm collaborations and discusses the hypotheses. Section 3 pre-
sents the research design. In section 4, the empirical results of the event study and of the 
multivariate analysis are reported. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 Inter-firm collaborations as value-creating mechanisms 
2.1 Previous studies 
Previous studies have used different approaches to examine the importance of 
inter-firm collaborations for firm success. These studies provide mixed results. Some 
scholars explore the impact of collaborations on firm survival. Whereas Baum & Oliver 
(1991), Uzzi (1996), and Miner et al. (1990) find that interorganizational linkages are 
positively related to firm survival, Schoonhoven & Lyman (2000) find no survival bene-
fits for new semiconductor firms.  
Recently, studies looked at the influence of (prominent) partnerships on IPO 
success by analyzing venture-capital-backed biotechnology firms. In their study of 301 
firms, Stuart et al. (1999) report that firms with prominent collaboration partners go 
faster to IPO and earn greater valuations. However, in their sample of 858 biotechnol-
                                            
2
 The definition is consistent with the large majority of papers in this field (see Parkhe, 1993; Gulati, 
1995; Schoonhoven & Lyman, 2000). Joint ventures are excluded as a special form of cooperation in 
which partners form a new corporate entity separate from the parent organizations (Kogut, 1988; 
Hauswald & Hege, 2002). 
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ogy firms, Gulati & Higgins (2003) find no relation between partnerships and IPO suc-
cess.  
Another stream of studies used event study methodology to examine stock price 
responses to collaboration announcements. Chan et al. (1997) discover a significant 
positive stock price response in their sample of 345 non-equity collaborations an-
nounced in the USA from 1983 to 1992. The finding is consistent with Neill et al. 
(2001) analyzing 89 non-equity collaborations in the information and technology sector 
published in the USA from 1987 to 1994. Das et al. (1998) report no significant market 
reactions to marketing cooperaton announcements, but a positive significant reaction to 
technology collaborations in their sample of 119 announcements in the USA from 1987 
to 1991. As a point of departure from these studies, this paper uses event study method-
ology to explore the impact of inter-firm collaboration on firm value.  
 
2.2 Theoretical framework  
 Theory provides several explanations why collaboration occur and in what way 
they influence firm value. The most common theories are the resource-based view, 
transaction cost theory, and signaling theory in the form of interorganizational en-
dorsement. The resource-based view posits that inter-firm collaborations can be seen as 
a source of new resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Wernerfeldt, 1984). The resource 
basis of a firm as an indicator of its rent-generating capability (Penrose, 1959) may be 
enhanced by resources acquired through collaborations. Hence, collaborations serve as a 
source of access to resources of various kinds, resulting in an increase in firm value 
(Gulati, 1995; Gulati et al., 2000).  
From the perspective of transaction cost theory, collaboration may be the least 
costly form of governance (Coase, 1937; 1960; Williamson, 1985) and therefore the 
most favourable coordination mechanism.3 Researchers also argue that collaborations 
provide organizational flexibility and allow rapid repositioning to changing demands 
                                            
3
 Arguments of resource-based view and transaction cost economics have most often been used independ-
ently to understand inter-firm collaborations. Recently, efforts have been made toward an integrative 
perspective combining elements of transaction cost theory and the resource-based view (e.g. Madhok & 
Tallman, 1998; Madhok, 2000). 
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and industry structure (Badaracco, 1991; Porter & Fuller, 1986; Mody, 1993; Das et al., 
1998), which helps to reduce future transaction costs.4 With collaborations, a hybrid 
form between markets and hierarchies (Williamson, 1985; Hennart, 1988; Gulati, 1995), 
becoming increasingly popular, the well-known “make or buy decision” has been turned 
into a “make or buy or cooperate decision.” 
Finally, interorganizational relationships can act as a positive signal of endorse-
ment to third parties (Podolny, 1994; Podolny et al., 1996; Stuart et al., 1999), espe-
cially for young and small companies (Carter & Manaster, 1990; Baum, 1996; Gulati & 
Higgings, 2003; Stuart et al., 1999). Market participants evaluate firms based on their 
own experience with the focal company or its observable quality. If the market actor has 
not dealt with the firm before, and/or the quality cannot be observed directly, other “ref-
erences” have to be taken into account. One relevant signal is the firm’s network and its 
evaluation through the attributes of exchange partners. The three presented theories 
shape the following hypotheses. 
 
2.3 Hypotheses 
Overall reaction to formation and termination announcements  
These three theories – resource-based view, transaction cost view, and signaling 
theory – suggest that there should be a positive relation between the announcement of 
collaboration and the perception of the value of firms. This line of reasoning leads to the 
first proposition:  
H1: The formation of an inter-firm collaboration results in a positive stock market reac-
tion, indicating an increase in firm value. 
Correspondingly, if the unexpected termination of a partnership is announced, a 
decrease in firm value would be anticipated. Even when potential synergies of an inter-
firm collaboration are present, changing competitive environments or management fail-
ures can lead to inefficiencies and the breakdown of the collaboration. Presumably, not 
all information about negative developments is captured by the stock market, and there-
                                            
4
 Transaction costs are the costs of negotiating, planning, monitoring and controlling exchange transac-
tions under the assumption of contractual inefficiencies (Jensen & Meckling, 1991; Picot, 1991; Milgrom 
& Roberts, 1992). 
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fore the announcement of a collaboration termination contains negative news which 
then lead to a reduction of the stock price.  
H2: The unexpected termination of an inter-firm collaboration results in a negative 
stock market reaction, indicating a decrease in firm value. 
The effect of partnering by industry type 
As emphasized by several researchers, the importance of cooperation depends on 
the industry structure in which the focal firm operates (e.g. Harrigan, 1985; Hagedoorn, 
1993). Technology-intensive firms (e.g., computers, software, semiconductors, biotech-
nology) tend to be more collaborative than low-technology firms (Harrigan, 1985; 
Mody, 1993). In the fast-changing and knowledge-intensive high-technology industry, 
collaborations are often the fastest and least cost-intensive way to acquire the resources 
necessary for keeping pace with competitors (Mowery et al., 1996).  
Moreover, since the assessment of technologies can be complex and resource-
consuming, evaluating firm quality is very difficult for market players. Therefore, they 
will pay more attention to favorable evaluations, as signaled by a cooperation an-
nouncement. These considerations comply with the findings of Chan et al. (1997) who 
detect a significant average abnormal return for high-technology firms on the collabora-
tion announcement day, whereas low-technology firms do not experience significant 
abnormal returns. Based on this line of reasoning, the third hypothesis follows:  
H3: Inter-firm collaboration announcements of firms operating in the high-technology 
sector result in a higher positive stock market reaction than among low-technology 
firms. 
Particularities of young and small firms  
Consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the resource-based view and 
signaling theory, collaborations are very important for a young company’s ability to 
attract necessary resources and overcome the legitimacy liability of having a short track 
record (Schoonhoven & Lyman, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999; Baum & Silverman, 1999). 
Whereas established companies are often well known and have various possibilities of 
acquiring necessary resources, young firms’ inter-firm collaborations may be crucial to 
survival. Although, the transaction cost approach offers differing arguments whether the 
effect of age on the value of collaboration for firms is positively or negatively. On the 
one side it can be argued that older firms have more experience with collaborations and 
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might be able to less costly accomplish the transaction, on the other side older firms 
have established organizational routines and are embedded in various contractual ar-
rangements that might make it more complex and costly to incorporate a new collabora-
tion into the administrative machinery. I presume that the proposition of the resource-
based view and signaling theory preponderate the conflicting arguments of the transac-
tion cost approach and therefore hypothesize that collaboration announcements of 
young firms are more stock-price–relevant than collaboration announcements of estab-
lished firms.  
H4: The age of the announcing firm is negatively correlated with the extent of positive 
stock market reactions to collaboration formation announcements.  
Size is another empirically robust indicator for uncertainty about the quality of a 
firm (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Gertler & Gilchrist, 1994). Economic agents have to rely 
heavily on signals because little public information on a small firm’s history and strat-
egy tends to be available. This leads to the conclusion that market agents react more on 
signals of small firms than they do of large firms. Empirical studies show that, meas-
ured on both a risk-adjusted and an unadjusted basis, small firms tend to have higher 
and more volatile stock returns than large firms (Banz, 1981; Reinganum, 1981; 
Zarowin, 1989; Fama & French, 1992). In a 1988 event study, Fama & French find that 
returns are less sensitive to variations in dividend yields on a portfolio that puts more 
weight on large firms than on an equal-weighted portfolio. 
The literature offers conflicting arguments when the effects of collaboration an-
nouncements on small and large companies are compared. According to Hagedoorn & 
Schakenraad (1994), potential profit from partnering is higher for large companies be-
cause successful partnering requires effective organization, which is usually only avail-
able to large firms. Similarly, Simonin (1997) suggests that to gain value from inter-
firm collaborations, disposable resources, expertise, and market power are required. 
Other researchers emphasize that small firms are characterized by high flexibility, 
which enables them to better leverage collaboration potential (Das et al., 1998). Teece 
(1992, 4) states that “cooperative agreements can enable smaller firms to emulate many 
of the functional aspects of large integrated enterprises, without suffering possible dys-
functions associated with large size.” Further, large firms often experience greater iner-
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tia due to their often exorbitant administrative machinery, which leads to inefficiencies 
(Van de Ven et al., 2000).5  
A negative correlation between size and value effects of partnering is presumed, 
leading to the following hypothesis: 
H5: Firm size of the announcing firm is negatively correlated with the extent of positive 
stock market reactions to inter-firm collaboration formation announcements. 
Collaboration constellations 
In addition to the size of the announcing firms, partner attributes are also influ-
encing the value mark-up of collaboration formation announcements. It is expected that 
a small firm announcing a partnership experiences a different stock market reaction if 
the partner is also a small firm than if the partner is a large firm. The last constellation is 
power unbalanced and therefore “asymmetrical”. Some researchers argue that this 
asymmetrical relationship is a very complex and risky endeavor for the small partner 
(Doz, 1998; Schoonhoven & Lyman, 2000).6 However, a relationship with a large part-
ner may convey that a firm has earned a positive evaluation from an influential market 
player. In addition, a large firm possesses a large resource pool to which the small firm 
may get access to. Therefore a higher positive reaction on the stock market is predicted 
compared to the other constellation, which leads to hypothesis 6:7   
                                            
5
 Indeed, Aldrich & Auster (1986, 183) emphasize: “The obstacles faced by new, small organizations can 
be easily overcome by larger, more established organizations, whereas the constraints faced by larger, 
more established organizations can often be easily surmounted by new, small organizations.” 
6
 Power asymmetry exacerbates relevancy differences in the strategies of weaker and stronger partners in 
inter-firm collaborations (Harrigan, 1985; Borys & Jemison, 1989). Most often, the weaker firm is more 
dependent on the success of the collaboration. Weak firms face serious difficulties, i.e., when the collabo-
ration needs unplanned, additional resources or the project plan is in delay. In addition, the weaker firm 
risks exploitation because the control over major decisions and property rights is often in the hands of the 
empowered firm (Lerner & Merges, 1998). 
7
 In this paper, I do not test if a small firm that enters a partnership with a large firm experiences a higher 
positive stock market reaction than the large firm. Chan et al. (1997) collected pairwise stock market data 
and found that the smaller partner firm shows a significant positive stock market reaction, whereas the 
larger partner shows no significant positive reaction. However, Neill et al. (2001) reported that the extent 
of positive stock market reaction does not differ between the larger and smaller partner.  
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H6: A small firm announcing an inter-firm collaboration with a large partner experi-
ences a higher positive stock market reaction than a small firm announcing an inter-firm 
collaboration with another small firm.  
Collaboration attributes 
Hypothesis 7 suggests that a different effect is anticipated when a collaborative 
agreement between partners is combined with equity ties of one or both partners as 
compared to a collaboration without equity ties. Equity ties may signal a higher com-
mitment and an “additional level of confidence” in the partnership (Stuart et al. 1999, 
320).  
Another reason for combining partnering and ownership may be that this con-
figuration is better equipped to deal with contractual inefficiencies. It is not possible to 
contractually specify all the terms of a relationship. However, firms may refrain from 
opportunistic action when the partner is a shareholder. Aghion and Tirole (1994) show 
in several models with relationship-specific investments by both parties that the optimal 
solution is one with partial ownership of an upstream firm by a downstream firm. Allen 
and Phillips (2000) demonstrate that abnormal returns are largest when an inter-firm 
collaboration announcement is combined with one partner taking an equity stake in the 
other. 
Based on this line of reasoning, the hypothesis is as follows:  
H7: Inter-firm collaboration announcements linked with an equity investment result in 
higher stock market reactions than collaborations without an equity investment. 
3 Research design 
3.1 Sample and data  
This study is based on ad hoc notifications of inter-firm collaborations pursuant 
to section 15 German Securities Trading Act (WpHG) in German stock markets from 
1997 to 2002.8 Since 1995, issuers must immediately publish any information that (1) 
comes within their sphere of activity and (2) is not publicly known, if such information 
is likely to exert influence on the stock exchange price of the admitted securities be-
                                            
8
 Compliance with this act is monitored by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BAFIN). 
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cause of the effect on the assets, financial position, or general trading position of the 
issuer. In Germany, electronic systems publish 99% of notifications fast and efficiently.9  
One thousand one hundred and fifty-seven collaboration notifications were pub-
lished in the relevant time period.10 Thompson Financial Datastream data were used to 
obtain stock prices of firms that announced a partnership within the observation period. 
Ten ad hoc announcement items were excluded because of data unavailability. Another 
109 news items were excluded because the common stock returns of the announcing 
firm were not available on the daily returns file for a period beginning 64 trading days 
prior to the announcement of the collaboration.11 Hence, the sample consists of 1037 ad 
hoc news items.  
3.2 Method of analysis 
3.2.1 Calculating abnormal returns 
The market value of a firm is the expected sum of discounted value of future 
cash flows (Brealey & Myers, 1988). The firm value adjusts when stock market receives 
information that changes the market expectations on the amount of future cash flow.  
Using event study methodology, I analyze whether there is an “abnormal” stock 
reaction associated with unanticipated ad hoc news items concerning inter-firm collabo-
rations (for the procedure see Brown & Warner, 1985; Watts, 1973). Three conditions 
must be satisfied in order to apply this methodology. First, the efficient market hypothe-
sis which claims that “(…) prices always ‘fully’ reflect available information (…)” must 
hold (Fama 1970, 383; see also Fama et al., 1969). Thus, stock prices should adjust in-
stantaneously to the announcement of an event. Second, the event must be unantici-
pated, i.e., the market must not have any information on the event before the an-
                                            
9
 Once the ad hoc announcement is issued, it takes on average only 30 minutes for the public to receive 
the information via electronic services. Announcements in US stock markets are subject to more hetero-
geneous timing. Hence, the German ad hoc announcements provide an interesting empirical lens for 
studying the impact of new information. See also footnote 13.  
10
 The appendix contains table A.1 which compares the overall incidence of ad hoc announcements to the 
incidence of announcements which inform about an inter-firm collaboration agreement.   
11
 The study uses daily stock prices from Thompson Financial Datastream that are adjusted for subsequent 
capital actions, dividend payment, and stock splits. The estimation period (60 days prior to the an-
nouncement day) is important for calculating the abnormal stock returns. See chapter 3.2.1. 
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nouncement. Finally, it must be possible to eliminate other effects in order to calculate 
how specific information influences firm value, i.e., confounding news must be elimi-
nated (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  
The impact of an event on the value of a firm’s stock is assessed by calculating 
the difference between the actual and expected returns on the stock during a relevant 
period surrounding the event, which is called the event period. To obtain the expected 
return as defined by McWilliams & Siegel (1997), the rate of return on the share of firm 
i on day t ( itR ) is regressed against the rate of return on a market portfolio of ( mtR ) on 
day t : 
 itmtiiit RR εβα ++=    (1) 
where  
itR  =  the rate of return on the share price of firm i on day t,  
mtR  =  the rate of return on a market portfolio of stocks on day t, 
itε  =  the error term, with 0)|( =mtit RE ε . 
The estimated coefficients iaˆ  and ibˆ from the OLS-regression of itR  on mtR  over 
a given estimation period are used to calculate the daily abnormal return (AR) of firm i 
using the equation:  
)ˆˆ( Mtiiitit RbaRAR +−=    (2) 
In this study, the event day is the day on which the announcement is published, 
unless the announcement is released after the stock exchange closing time. In that case, 
the following day is classified as event day.12 The selection of the event period is one of 
the most critical issues in using event studies. In the literature, the length of the event 
period varies enormously, e.g. from 9 months (e.g. Davidson & Worrell, 1992) to 2 
days (e.g. Koh & Venkatraman, 1991). Several researchers recommend using a small 
window, because (1) a long event window severely reduces the power of the test statis-
tic (Brown & Warner, 1985); (2) the market efficiency hypothesis states instantaneous 
stock price reactions to events; and (3) the assumption of stationary parameters becomes 
                                            
12
 The stock exchange closing time changed twice during the observation period. 
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less plausible by use of a long event window (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Moreover, 
Mitchell & Netter (1989) report a stock market reaction within 90 minutes, and Dann et 
al. (1977) within 15 minutes following the announcement of information. In the case of 
collaboration announcements, I expect that the stock price adjusts within the an-
nouncement day.13  
The event period as the period to capture the excess return must be differentiated 
from the estimation period that is used to estimate the parameters. To estimate the daily 
market model parameters for each firm, an estimation period of 60 trading days begin-
ning with 64 days prior to the event and ending 5 days prior to the event is used. The 
relevant market index for each firm follows from the stock index affiliation; for firms 
                                            
13
 Publication of significant events differs between Germany and the USA. In Germany, the announce-
ment of ad hoc news is nationwide regulated since 1995 (see section 15 German Securities and Trading 
Act). Stock listed companies are required to immediately disclose “private” information that is likely to 
have a material effect on the valuation of the issuer. The vast majority of ad hoc news items are published 
immediately over the electronic system of DGAP (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad-hoc-Publizität mbH), 
which enters the news directly in the editorial systems of Reuters, vwd (Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienste 
GmbH) and Bloomberg. In the USA “material” information is differently published between the Self-
Regulatory Organizations (e.g. NYSE). For instance the NYSE claims that many “NYSE rules” are more 
stringent than those of other Self-Regulatory-Organizations (NYSE, 2004). In the USA events are often 
made public through electronic systems (Edgar, Reuters, Bloomberg) or The Wall Street Journal. The 
majority of previous event studies use data from the USA. Most researchers collected news items based 
on an announcement in The Wall Street Journal. Several studies use an event period that includes the 
event day and the preceding trading day, because the first documented announcement occurs often on the 
day before the event appears in the journal (e.g., McConnell & Nantell, 1985, Woolridge & Snow 
(1990)). Within the last few years the U.S. Securities of Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced two 
significant changes regarding publication behavior. Until October 2000 many US stock listed firms prac-
ticed “selective disclosure”, in which firms give material information only to a few selected analysts and 
institutional investors prior to disclosing it publicly. This behavior was widely criticized and finally 
stopped by the SEC taking effect in October 23, 2000 with the “Regulation Fair Disclosure Rule”. From 
now on “material information” has to be made publish within five business days, whereby the mechanism 
of publishing has not been standardized (SEC, August 15, 2000, File No.: S7-31-99: “the required public 
disclosure may be made by filing or furnishing a Form 8-K, or by another method or combination of 
methods that is reasonably designed to effect broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to 
the public.” Taking effect on August 24, 2004 the SEC expands the list of reportable events and shortens 
the deadline for most items from five to four business days within the news have to be widely published 
(SEC, March 16, 2004 File No.: S7-22-02).  
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belonging to the DAX, the DAX index is used; for firms listed at the Neuer Markt, the 
NEMAX ALL Share-index is used; and for the remaining firms, the CDAX index is 
adopted.  
Multivariate analysis 
To address the research questions concerning the influence of size, age, and col-
laboration characteristics on the extent of abnormal returns to collaboration announce-
ments, I conduct a multivariate analysis. The power of this method is that it allows ce-
teris paribus interpretations (e.g. Wooldridge, 1999).  
After estimating the model with all control variables, I check for over fitting. 
Controlling for too many variables does not mean that the calculated coefficients of 
such a specification are biased, but that they are less precise than without the inclusion 
of statistically irrelevant variables. Dependent variables or control variables that satisfy 
all of the following criteria are therefore excluded in the optimized model:  
a) the coefficients of the variables are individually insignificant, 
b) the Wald test for joint significance of all variables of the same type is insignifi-
cant. 
Measures 
In the following sections, I briefly describe the variables used in the multivariate analy-
sis.  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the abnormal return at the event day. The variable re-
sults from the event study. The sample excludes termination announcements and an-
nouncements with confounding news.  
Independent Variables 
Testing the hypothesis, the following independent variables are used:  
High-technology versus non-high–technology 
The variable high-technology is coded 1 if the observation relates to high-
technology firms, 0 otherwise. Firms are classified as high-technology if they belong to 
the following groups as classified by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority 
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(BAFIN) industry classes: biotechnology, internet, IT services, software, technology, 
and telecommunication.14  
Age  
Since the founding date was not available in all cases, the days since the firm is 
listed at the stock market is used as a proxy variable for the age of the announcing firm. 
The variable is calculated by taking the logarithm of the number of days between the 
first day the firm is listed on the stock market and the announcement day.15  
Size  
In this study, size is measured as the logarithm of the market value of stocks on 
the third trading day preceding the announcement. 
Collaboration constellations  
Five dummy variables are constructed to show differences among collaboration 
constellations. A firm is classified as small when its market capitalization on the event 
day is ranked below the median of the market capitalization of all other firms in the 
sample. I use this approach to exclude the effects of cold and hot markets on the market 
value of stocks. A ranking is more stable than the volatile market capitalization. The 
relative partner size was extracted from the full text of the ad hoc news items published 
by the announcing firm pursuant to section 15 of the German Securities Trading Act 
(WpHG). In cases where less information was provided, a website search was con-
ducted for information about firms’ annual accounts. Collaborations that cannot be 
clearly assigned to one group are classified in the subgroup “others.”  
- “Small - small” = 1 if a small firm announces an inter-firm collaboration with another 
small firm, 0 otherwise. This group will serve as the reference case. 
                                            
14
 Firms are classified as low-technology if they belong to the following groups: automo-
bile/transportation and logistics; banking; construction; basic resources; financial services; industrial; 
retail/consumer cyclical/food and beverages; machinery; entertainment; utilities; others. The classification 
corresponds with the Business Week’s and the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority’s industry classi-
fication system. 
15
 This proxy variable needs to be considered with caution, since the mean time from incorporation to 
public offering decreased within the last decades. Therefore, the proxy is expected to underestimate the 
age of older firms compared to younger ones. 
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- “Small - large” = 1 if a small firm announces an inter-firm collaboration with a large 
firm, 0 otherwise,  
- “Large - large” = 1 if a large firm announces an inter-firm collaboration with another 
large firm, 0 otherwise,  
- “Large - small” = 1 if a large firm announces an inter-firm collaboration with a small 
firm, 0 otherwise, 
- “Others” = 1 if a clear assignment to the other groups was not possible, 0 otherwise. 
Equity investment  
The model includes three dummy variables for inter-firm collaborations that are associ-
ated with equity investments:  
- “Investment of focal firm” = 1 if the announcing firm invests in the partner firm, 0 
otherwise, 
- “Investment of partner firm” = 1 if the partner firm invests in the announcing firm, 0 
otherwise, 
- “two-way investment” = 1 if the equity investment is two-way, 0 otherwise. 
The reference case is an observation without equity investment. 
Control variables  
A number of variables known or expected to affect the value mark-up of an in-
ter-firm collaboration announcement but not contained in the discussion of the hypothe-
ses are added as controls. I include a dummy variable for partner location. Some schol-
ars argue that non-domestic collaborations are in more danger of failure stemming from 
cultural distances (Schoonhoven & Lyman, 2000). However, entering collaborations 
with a non-German firm shows that the interest in the focal firm spans nations. More-
over, such international partnerships signal a higher growth potential for the announcing 
firm.  
To control for the effect of being listed in a relatively new market segment, I in-
clude a dummy variable to separate firms listed at the Neue Markt from firms listed in 
other market segments. The Neue Markt, founded in March 1997, was a market seg-
ment for high growth and technology firms with more stringent governance principles 
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for market participants.16 Severe loss of confidence in high-technology stocks after the 
global slump and a string of corporate scandals resulted in the early dissolution of this 
stock segment on March 21, 2003.  
According to Gulati & Higgins (2003), investors observe signals during bullish 
markets differently from signals during bearish markets. In their recent study, Pástor & 
Veronesi (2003) report that IPO waves are preceded by an increased disparity between 
new and established firms in terms of their valuations and return volatilities. During the 
observation period, stock market conditions changed enormously. To capture the effects 
of temporal trends, a dummy variable is added for each half year of the time period.  
Additionally, I control for different types of collaborations. Each collaboration is 
classified according to whether it can be described as horizontal or vertical.17 Horizontal 
collaborations increase market power, whereas with vertical collaborations, firms may 
attract complementary assets or know-how. Koh & Venkatraman (1991) find that hori-
zontal joint ventures are more productive for the parents than vertical collaborations. 
Chan et al. (1997) report similar findings looking at collaboration announcements.  
Four additional dummies are integrated to differentiate between marketing col-
laborations, R&D collaborations, licensing collaborations, and announcements that ei-
ther failed to report the objective or did not clearly specify the purpose for forming the 
collaboration. Das et al. (1998) report significant differences in the stock market’s reac-
tion to technology versus marketing collaborations. Whereas the stock market’s reaction 
to technology collaborations is positive, its reaction to marketing collaborations is sta-
tistically indistinguishable from zero in their study.  
4 Empirical tests and results 
4.1 Abnormal returns due to inter-firm collaboration announcements 
Table 1 presents the abnormal returns to collaboration announcements and the 
standard errors over a time period from two days before to two days after the an-
nouncements. The first column identifies the trading day relative to event day zero. The 
                                            
16
 Regulation required that all firms listed at the Neuer Markt submit their annual reports either under IAS 
or US-GAAP.  
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second column displays the abnormal returns of formation announcements that include 
confounding news. Column three contains the abnormal returns of pure collaboration 
formation announcements, and column four reports the abnormal returns of collabora-
tion termination announcements.  
The average abnormal return of collaboration announcements with confounding 
news at the day of the event is 3.8%. In column three it is shown that collaboration an-
nouncements without multiples news display a slightly higher excess return of 3.9% at 
the day of the event.18 Hence, confounding news items have a small reducing effect on 
abnormal returns. Possible explanations are: first, collaboration announcements may 
experience a higher positive effect than announcements of other events which being 
combined have a smaller effect than the collaboration announcement alone; and second, 
collaboration announcements as positive information about a firm are likely combined 
with negative news to dilute the expected negative stock market reaction.  
The results show that the formation of an inter-firm collaboration results in posi-
tive abnormal stock returns, indicating an increase in firm value.19 The abnormal returns 
on the announcement day are highly significant in both samples. Other studies find a 
lower effect of collaboration announcements on stock market prices. In their study of 
345 collaboration announcements of US firms from 1983 to 1992, Chan et al. (1997) 
report an abnormal stock market return of 0.64% at the event day. In their study of 119 
collaboration announcements in the USA from 1987 to 1991, Das et al. (1998) discover 
only a significant (10% level) positive abnormal return of 0.5% at the day of the an-
nouncement and the following day together. 
 
Column 4 sheds light on the abnormal return following a collaboration termina-
tion announcement. On the announcement day, a significant negative abnormal return of 
                                            
18
 Conspicuously, significant negative abnormal rents occur in the days following the event day. Whereas 
this phenomenon is seen in several event studies, a rational explanation is not found, yet (see for similar 
market anomalies Kaserer & Ahlers, 2000; Ikenberry et al., 1995). In this study, I find that the results 
regarding the hypothesis are robust when I use a longer event window (day of the event plus following 
trading day).  
19
 The cross-sectional average (median) of market value increases by about € 6.9 millions in the case of 
pure collaboration announcements. 
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4.2% is displayed. The results indicate that the market punishes an unforeseen break-
down of an inter-firm collaboration with a decrease in firm value that is on the same 
order as the gain from the announcement of such collaboration. 






(events with confounding 
news included)  
Mean abnormal return 
(n=1011) 
Inter-firm collaboration 











Mean abnormal return 
(n=26) 
-2 0.005**  (0.002)  0.004*  (0.002)  -0.004  (0.010) 
-1  0.001  (0.002)  0.001  (0.002)  -0.033*  (0.023) 
0  0.038  (0.004)  0.039***  (0.003)  -0.042**  (0.017) 
1  -0.009***  (0.002)  -0.008***  (0.002)  -0.005  (0.012) 
2  -0.004**  (0.002)  -0.004**  (0.002)  0.004  (0.008) 
Numbers in parentheses represent associated standard errors.  
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Industry effects 
To get a first impression of industry effects—whether there are differences in 
excess returns to collaboration formation announcements of high-technology versus 
non-high–technology firms—the sample without confounding news is divided in two 
groups. The calculations show a highly significant abnormal return at the event day of 
4.7% for high-technology firms (n = 603; standard error = 0.004) and of 2.2% for non-
high–technology firms (n = 288; standard error = 0.005). The abnormal return of high-
technology firms is 2.5 percentage points higher than for non-high–technology firms. 
The difference of means test shows statistical significance. Table 2 summarizes the 
event study outcomes on industry effects. In comparison, in their study of 345 collabo-
ration announcements in the US stock market in the years 1983 to 1992, Chan et al. 
(1997) report a significant average abnormal return of 1.12% for high-technology firms 
and an insignificant abnormal return of 0.10% for low-technology firms at the event 
day. Analyzing a sample of 89 US non-equity collaborations in the information and 
technology sector published in the years 1987 to 1994, Neill et al. (2001) find an ab-




Table 2: Industry specific abnormal returns and difference of means test 
Abnormal returns at announcement day to formation of strategic collaborations 
High-technology firms 
Mean abnormal return (n=603) 
Non-high–technology firms  
Mean abnormal return (n=288) 
0.047*** (0.004) 0.022*** (0.005) 
Difference of means test: t=3.529*** (0.007) 
Numbers in parentheses represent associated standard errors.  
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis  
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and the inde-
pendent variables.20 The cross-sectional average abnormal return at the announcement 
day is 3.9% with a relatively high standard deviation of 10%. The majority of firms op-
erate in the high-technology sector (68%). At the announcement day, the average firm is 
since 434 days listed at the stock market. The average market capitalization of the firms 
in the sample is € 166 millions at the third trading day preceding the announcement. 
The most frequent collaboration constellation is the one in which a large firm publishes 
collaboration with another large firm (36%). Followed by the constellations in which a 
small firm announces an inter-firm collaboration with a large firm (20%) or with an-
other small firm (16%). Only 5% of collaboration formation notifications are from large 
firms that announce an inter-firm collaboration with a small firm. Presumably, this con-
stellation is rarely seen as stock price relevant. The bulk of announced collaborations 
are without equity ties (93%). Only 1.3% of the collaborations in the sample go along 
with a two-way investment, 3.5% are combined with an investment of the announcing 
firm in the partner firm, and 2.6% are combined with an investment of the partner in the 
announcing firm. The Pearson product moment correlation matrix and the descriptive 
statistic of control variables are presented in the appendix. 
                                            
20
 I restrict the multivariate analysis to explore the determinants of the value mark-up of collaboration 
formation announcements, because of the small number of termination announcements that appeared in 
the observation period.  
  
 20
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  Mean   Std. dev.  Min  Max 
Abnormal return  0.039  0.101  -0.930    0.760 
High-technology firm  0.677  0.468    0    1 
Log (age)   6.072  1.018    4.127    9.299 
Log (size)   5.112  1.701  -0.511  12.477 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Small firm – small firm  0.163  0.369   0     1 
Small firm – large firm  0.201  0.401   0     1 
Large firm – small firm  0.054  0.226   0      1 
Large firm – large firm  0.362  0.481   0              1 
Relative size unclear  0.220  0.414   0              1 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
No investment    0.926  0.262   0              1 
Investment of focal firm 0.035  0.183     0              1 
Investment of partner firm 0.026  0.159    0              1 
Two-way investment   0.013  0.115        0              1 
 
The full model and the reduced model are reported in table 4. The first column 
identifies the independent variable. The second column lists the results of the full 
model. In column three and four the test results for over fitting are reported. The fifth 
column contains the results of the reduced model. Both models are estimated by a re-
gression with heteroscedastic standard errors.21  
Table 4: Regression for the effects on abnormal returns 











Non high-tech Reference case   Reference case 
High-tech 0.023*** 
(0.007) 
  0.021*** 
(0.006) 
Log (age)  0.011** 
(0.005) 
  0.010** 
(0.005) 
Log (size)  -0.008*** 
(0.002) 
  -0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Relative partner size     
Small firm – small firm Reference case   Reference case 
Large firm – large firm 0.003 
(0.011) 
  0.006 
(0.010) 
Small firm – large firm 0.028** 
(0.013) 
  0.032*** 
(0.012) 
                                            
21
 The Cook-Weisberg test reports indication of heteroscedastic distribution of residuals after OLS regres-
sion. Therefore, a regression with robust standard errors was conducted.  
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Large firm – small firm 0.000 
(0.013) 
  0.001 
(0.012) 
Relative size unclear -0.006 
(0.011) 
  -0.001 
(0.010) 
Equity ties     
No investment Reference case   Reference case 
Investment of focal firm -0.022* 
(0.012) 
  -0.023** 
(0.011) 
Investment of partner firm 0.002 
(0.023) 
  -0.002 
(0.023) 
Two-way investment 0.026 
(0.022) 
  0.023 
(0.022) 
Control variables     
Partner location in Ger-
many 
Reference case    








Not Neuer Markt firm Reference case   Reference case 
Neuer Markt firm 0.016* 
(0.008) 
  0.017** 
(0.008) 
Type (relatedness)     














Type of collaboration     
- Marketing collaboration Reference case    
- R&D collaboration 0.008 
(0.015) 
 
- Licensing   0.018 
(0.014) 
 









Half year dummies     
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 Only one collaboration notification was published in the first half of 1998. The announcing firm, 
EM.TV & Merchandising AG, experienced an abnormal return of 22% at the day of the event. 
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- 1st half of 2000 Reference case 
 
Reference case 



















  -0.020 
(0.031) 




* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Standard error in parentheses; Total of 891 
events. 
 
I first comment briefly on the control variables included in the full model and 
explain whether they will be omitted in the reduced model before the results of the re-
duced model are presented and discussed. The control variable Neuer Markt, which dis-
tinguishes firms listed at the Neuer Markt from those listed at other market segments, 
shows a p-value of 0.054 and indicates that abnormal returns of Neuer Markt firms are 
1.6 percentage points higher than abnormal returns of other market segments. The vari-
able partner location measuring whether there is a different effect on abnormal returns 
when the partner is located outside Germany shows a positive but insignificant effect. In 
contrast to the outcome of Chan et al. (1997) the results suggest that a vertical collabo-
ration causes higher abnormal stock returns than a horizontal collaboration. But again, 
the coefficient is not significant. R&D and licensing collaborations tend to have higher 
abnormal returns than marketing collaborations, although not significantly so.  
The full model controls for effects of changes in market conditions by including 
dummies for each half year of the time period. The coefficients measure time effects in 
comparison to the second half of the year 2000 in which the stock market faced a con-
tinuous downturn. The estimated coefficients are insignificant, except for the coefficient 
for the first half of 1998. In a further analysis I test whether the results are differing be-
tween collaboration announcements in cold and hot stock market. Therefore the sample 
is divided in two groups. The “hot stock-market” group consists of announcements from 
January 1, 1997 to March 31, 2000 with a favorable stock market climate; the “cold 
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market” group consists of announcements from April 1, 2000 to the end of 2002 when 
the stock market faced a period of downturn. I test whether the coefficients estimated 
over one group of the data are equal to the coefficients estimated over the other group. 
The Chow test indicates no differences between the two groups (F=0.84; 
Prob>F=0.6487).  
I also control for over fitting of the estimated model. A Wald test is conducted to 
check for joint insignificance of a group of variables. Column 3 of table 4 shows that 
the coefficients of several variables are jointly insignificant. The Wald test affirms joint 
significance of the included half-year dummies. The result suggests the importance of 
including them in the reduced model.  
The reduced model in column 5 shows that there is a significant difference be-
tween high-technology firms and non-high–technology firms (hypothesis 3). Collabora-
tion announcements by high-technology firms lead to an abnormal return that is 2.1 
percentage points higher than by non-high–technology firms. collaborations entered by 
a firm operating in the fast changing and knowledge-intensive high-technology sector 
are considered more favorable than collaborations by non-high–technology firms.  
Hypothesis 4 proposes that firm age is negatively related to the abnormal returns 
to collaboration announcements. Surprisingly, firm age is highly significant positive 
related to abnormal returns. Indeed, the estimated coefficients imply that a 1% increase 
in age results in a 0.010 percentage point higher abnormal return. An explanation for 
this finding might be that young firms face severe difficulties in attaining the potential 
increase in firm value from collaborations. Higher uncertainty results from the typically 
fewer experience of young firms’ managers in managing collaborations, and the fewer 
resources that are available to redirect an inter-firm collaboration if the partnership un-
dergoes an unfavorable development.  
According to hypothesis 5, firm size is negatively correlated with the percentage 
of abnormal returns to collaboration announcements. The highly significant coefficient 
of firm size suggests that a 1% increase of size leads to a 0.008 percentage points lower 
abnormal return on the event day. From the results, it is clear that an inter-firm collabo-
ration announcement by a smaller firm is more rewarded than by a larger firm, pre-
sumably because market players react more on small firms’ signals. 
Hypothesis 6 puts different collaboration constellations to the test. The reference 
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group is an announcement from a small firm that enters an inter-firm cooperation with 
another small firm. The constellation in which a small firm announces the formation 
with a large firm is clearly the one that leads to the highest abnormal return. According 
to the estimated model, these collaborations exhibit an abnormal return that is 3.2 per-
centage points higher than that in the reference case. Similarly, the other two possible 
constellations show a positive coefficient, indicating that they add more value than the 
reference case. However, the coefficients are not significant.  
Hypothesis 7 proposes that collaboration announcements linked with an equity 
investment result in higher abnormal returns than collaborations without an equity in-
vestment. Contrary to the expectation, an investment of the announcing firm in the part-
ner firm significantly diminishes the extent of abnormal returns by 2.3 percentage 
points. Similarly, the coefficient of the variable partner investment is negative but in-
significant. Reciprocal equity ties show a positive but insignificant coefficient. The sig-
nificant negative effect of an equity tie of the focal company on the value of the col-
laboration raises questions about the value of a strong commitment. On the one hand, an 
equity investment in the partner signals an additional level of confidence in the partner. 
On the other hand, an equity investment constitutes a strong commitment by making 
irreversible and specialized investments that render alternative options relatively more 
costly (Williamson, 1985). The results suggest that the market evaluates a weak com-
mitment to be more favorable than a strong commitment. Presumably because in the 
case of a weak commitment the announcing firm can less expensively and more easily 
deviate from the announced action than with a strong commitment.  
5 Conclusion and limitations 
The paper sets out to explore, by analyzing stock market returns, whether part-
nering pays off. The results show that whereas a formation of an inter-firm collabora-
tion increases firm valuation, an unexpected termination notification decreases firm 
valuation. The study further explores the determinants that influence the value mark-up 
of entering collaborations. I find that with regard to firm industry, firm characteristics, 
and collaboration attributes, certain collaborations are more favorable than others. Re-
garding high-technology versus non-high–technology firms, the results suggest that 
high-technology firms profit more from entering collaborations than non-high–
technology firms. Contrary to expectations, the age of the announcing firm is positively 
correlated to the extent of positive abnormal returns. Presumably, investors rely more 
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on the experience of older firms than on younger firms in attaining synergies from col-
laborations. The hypothesis that smaller firms gain more from collaborations than larger 
ones is backed by the findings. Moreover, the empirical analysis demonstrates that the 
highest positive stock returns are experienced when a small firm announces a partner-
ship with a large firm. The results also indicate that an inter-firm collaboration an-
nouncement in which the announcing firms invest in the partner is punished by signifi-
cantly lower abnormal returns than in collaborations without partner investment.  
The results have important implications for future research as well as for man-
agement. Regarding academic research, I find that the value impact of inter-firm coor-
dination as a governance form varies systematically between industry, firm characteris-
tics, collaboration partners and collaboration types. Consequently, investors should look 
closely at collaboration announcements and evaluate the different types and firm situa-
tions. Firm managers should be aware that firm characteristics, collaboration character-
istics and by with whom a firm is associated drive the impact of inter-firm collabora-
tions 
The current study faces limitations that open avenues for future research. Several 
researchers emphasize that entering an inter-firm collaboration with a prominent col-
laboration partner may act as an endorsement for the focal firm (see, i.e., Saxton, 1997; 
Stuart et al., 1999), thus influences firm value. This study does not take the prominence 
of the collaboration partner into consideration. The dataset consists of announcements 
from firms operating in diverse industries. It is a complex undertaking to find a uniform 
valid measure for prominence over all these industries. Whereas in the field of biotech-
nology, patent citations may be an acceptable measure for prominence of the collabora-
tion partner, the measure would not be useful for a firm that operates in media enter-
tainment. Future research is suggested to supplement this study by including a valid 
measure for the prominence of the collaboration partners.  
This study analyzes what drives the impact of collaboration on firm value. How-
ever, the study does not comprehensively elaborate on the upcoming questions regard-
ing explanations for the detected differences, i.e.: Why do older firms profit more from 
entering collaborations than younger ones? Why is firm value influenced by an invest-
ment of the announcing firm in the partner firm but not by an investment of the partner 
firm in the announcing firm? It would greatly improve our knowledge of inter-firm col-
laborations to understand the reasons for these differences. An in-depth survey study 
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may shed light on the raised issues. 
The present study sets out to investigate the impact of collaborations on firm 
value. Industry structure, firm characteristics, collaboration constellations and partner 
attributes are identified as value determinants. The study will hopefully be a useful con-
tribution to further the understanding of inter-firm collaborations and to improve part-





A.1: Number of ad hoc news in the German market (1997-2002) 
 
A.2: Correlation matrix of dependent and metric independent variables 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Abnormal return  log (age) log (size) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Abnormal return   1.000 
log(age)   0.050   1.000 




A.3: Descriptive statistics of control variables  
___________________________________________________________________ 
Variable    Mean                   Std. Dev.          Min         Max 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Partner location Germany 0.512     0.500              0             1 
Partner location not Germany 0.474     0.500             0             1 
Neuer Markt firm  0.746     0.435              0             1 
Not Neuer Markt firm   0.254     0.435              0             1 
1st half of 1997    0.007     0.082              0             1 
2nd half of 1997     0.007     0.082              0             1 
1st half of 1998     0.001     0.034              0             1 
2nd half of 1998     0.027     0.162              0             1 
1st half of 1999     0.039     0.194              0             1 
2nd half of 1999     0.111  0.314              0             1 
1st half of 2000     0.262     0.440             0             1 
2nd half of 2000     0.241     0.428              0             1 
1st half of 2001     0.121     0.327             0             1 
2nd half of 2001     0.091     0.288              0             1 
1st half of 2002     0.057     0.232              0             1 
2nd half of 2002     0.034     0.180              0             1 
  Total 1997-2002 By years 
Total number of 
ad hoc news 












(5.3% of total number)
1997: 16 (1,38%) 
1998: 42 (3.63%) 
1999: 209 (18.06%) 
2000: 552 (47.71%) 
2001: 238 (20.57%) 




Horizontal collaboration 0.343     0.475             0             1 
Vertical collaboration  0.603     0.490              0             1 
Neither horiz. nor vertic. 0.049     0.217              0             1 
R&D collaboration  0.047     0.212              0             1 
Marketing collaboration 0.770     0.487              0             1 
Licensing   0.079     0.269              0             1 
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